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Abstract
Do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo? We exploit
exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870,000
municipal vote outcomes in Switzerland to address this question. The empirical tests
are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data. We
find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change. Our robustness checks
suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate
and changes in information acquisition. In addition, we provide evidence that rain
might have altered the outcome of several high-stake votes. We discuss the psychologi-
cal mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks, a pattern
that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change.
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1 Introduction
Many decisions involve the choice between keeping the status quo or opting for change. The
human tendency to maintain the status quo, usually the default option, has been documented
in a variety of important contexts, including the decision to use default retirement plans
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001), organ donations (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003), and politics
(Lee, 2008; Alesina and Passarelli, 2015). Previous literature has attributed the status quo
effect to uncertainty (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), loss aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler, 1991), and choice fatigue (Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso, 2011; Augenblick
and Nicholson, 2016; Hessami and Resnjanskij, 2019). Little is known, however, about the
effect of emotions on the tendency to keep the status quo. This is surprising in light of
the recent contributions in economics which demonstrate the impact of emotions on human
decision-making (Kamstra, Kramer and Levi, 2003; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011; Cohn et al.,
2015; Callen et al., 2014; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Meier, 2019).1
In this paper, we study how emotions affect the fundamental decision between keeping
or changing the status quo. We exploit rainfall as an exogenous source of variation in
emotions (Lambert et al., 2002; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Baylis et al., 2018) and
examine whether voters are more or less likely to support a policy change on a rainy voting
weekend. We analyze a novel data set that contains more than 870,000 municipal-level direct
democratic vote outcomes from 420 federal propositions in Switzerland between 1958 and
2014. We use administrative voting and individual postvote survey data to estimate the
effect of rain on the propensity to vote for political change. We find that rain on a voting
weekend decreases support for changing the status quo. A simple simulation indicates that
this rain effect potentially swayed several vote outcomes.
We discuss two alternative explanations, other than emotional reactions, that could ex-
plain the negative relationship between rain and the share of yes votes. First, we rule out
that changes in the composition of the constituency can explain the empirical regularity.
Across a battery of checks we show, among others, that: (i) overall turnout is not affected
1An excellent general account on emotions and decision-making is provided in Lerner et al. (2015). The
bridge to economic reasoning is nicely built in Loewenstein (2000).
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by whether it rained on the voting weekend, (ii) there is no statistically detectable heteroge-
neous reaction to rain on the individual level according to the ex-ante propensity to vote yes,
partisanship, or ideology, and (iii) the relationship between rain and voting for the status quo
on the municipal level holds conditional on turnout and other proxies for the composition of
the electorate. Second, we investigate whether the use of different information channels can
explain the rain effect but find no evidence for this explanation. In addition, we show that
the effect is driven by citizens who cast their ballot card on the voting weekend, rather than
by those who vote beforehand by mail. Moreover, our results indicate that the effect of rain
also prevails in votes that are decided by a narrow margin and high turnout votes.
Switzerland provides a unique setting to study citizens’ policy choices as most major polit-
ical decisions are subject to a popular vote. These political decisions are highly salient due to
broad media coverage. In addition, vote outcomes from referendums and popular initiatives
are binding. Examples of high-stake ballots include Switzerland’s vote on its membership
in the European Economic Area, a proposal to introduce a federal debt brake, and several
votes on the introduction of a comprehensive minimum wage scheme. Importantly, Swiss vot-
ers have substantial experience with popular votes (Schmid, 2016; Bechtel, Hangartner and
Schmid, 2016, 2018; Stutzer, Baltensperger and Meier, 2019). Thus, our findings are robust
to the concern that the influence of psychological factors vanishes as individual experience
increases (List, 2003; Levitt and List, 2008). Finally, the framing of the decision emphasizes
the potential new future legal situation. In the official description of the ballot proposals,
the new alternative statutory or constitutional law is explicitly discussed in reference to the
current legal status quo. Accordingly, an approval of the policy change always requires a yes
vote, while adherence to the status quo requires a no vote. This enables a straightforward
interpretation of the effect of rain on vote outcomes as lowering support for political change.
What might drive this rain effect? We discuss several psychological mechanisms and
conclude that a specific version of the projection bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2003) offers the most plausible explanation. Emotions affect risk aversion and consequently
alter the evaluation of the policy options (Schwarz, 2012). The intuition is that positive
emotions lead to more optimistic evaluations of change, while negative emotions lead to
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more cautious appraisals. Consistent with this, we document that reported willingness to
take risks is lower if it rains, based on complementary data.
We think that our results are important for at least two reasons. First, the direct demo-
cratic votes that we study are collective decisions with major policy implications. If psy-
chological factors alter such high-stake collective choices, we should take this evidence into
account for institutional design. For example, one could reduce the number of concurrent
votes on a voting weekend to mitigate emotional impacts. Second, our findings from field
data suggest that negative emotions lead people to favor the status quo. This tendency may
be relevant in other domains — for instance, in labor market decisions and health choices.
Choice architects should thus be aware that decisions may be affected by external emotional
cues that systematically affect peoples’ trade-offs between the status quo and change.
This study relates to at least three strands of research. First, we add to a growing
literature that explores the role of emotions for decision-making in field settings (DellaVigna,
2009). Studies have exploited the fact that the performance of a sports team affects mood,
and consequently influences the ruling of judges, the evaluation of politicians, and family
conflicts (Healy, Malhotra and Mo, 2010, 2015; Card and Dahl, 2011; Fowler and Montagnes,
2015; Eren and Mocan, 2018). Our study is, to our knowledge, the first that explicitly
explores whether emotions affect outcomes through risk aversion (DellaVigna, 2009, p. 359).
Second, we add to the new field of behavioral political economy that investigates why
and how citizens vote based on a broader account of human motivation (see Schnellenbach
and Schubert, 2015 for a review). In this vein, DellaVigna et al. (2017) document that social
image concerns are important in explaining why people vote. Augenblick and Nicholson
(2016) show that choice fatigue can cause voters to take decision shortcuts, such as voting
for the status quo. Previous research also examines the role of visual cues, including a
candidate’s physical appearance as a heuristic to assess politicians (Berggren, Jordahl and
Poutvaara, 2010) and the role of general life satisfaction in retrospective voting (Liberini,
Redoano and Proto, 2017). Our findings also add to the literature on emotions in politics.
Scholars have argued that politics fuels emotions and, at the same time, emotions motivate
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political engagement, such as the decision of whether to oppose the government (Marcus,
2000; van Winden, 2015; Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017).2
Third, we contribute to the recent work on the effects of rain on elections. This litera-
ture argues that rainfall primarily alters the cost of voting. This in turn impacts turnout
(Hansford and Gomez, 2010; Fraga and Hersh, 2011; Lind, 2017; Arnold and Freier, 2016;
Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl, 2016; Becker, Fetzer and Novy, 2017) and participation rates in
political rallies (Madestam et al., 2013). Our findings suggest that rainfall not only indirectly
affects voting results by changing the constituency, but also directly alters the voting deci-
sions of citizens. Our evidence from observational data complements previous experimental
findings by Bassi (2019) who shows that weather conditions affect how voters evaluate the
incumbent.3
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the institutional
environment in Switzerland, our data sources, and our empirical strategy. Section 3 explores
the effect of rain on vote outcomes. We first present the main results and then conduct
two placebo tests. In addition, we explore alternative explanations for the main empirical
regularity including a change in composition of the electorate due to rain. Finally, we high-
light the size and real-world impact of the rain effect. In Section 4, we discuss the potential
mechanisms behind the relationship between rain and voting behavior and other aspects that
are relevant for the assessment of the generalizability of our findings. Section 5 concludes
and suggests directions for future research on emotions and the choice between change and
the status quo.
2For reviews on emotions in economics, politics and political philosophy, see, for example, Elster (1998,
1999) and Marcus (2000).
3For a recent overview on the influence of weather on economic outcomes, see Dell, Jones and Olken
(2013).
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2 Institutions, Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Institutions
Switzerland is a democratic federal country with a two-chamber parliament and important
elements of direct democracy. Citizens decide in several votes throughout the year on policy
propositions and the corresponding vote outcomes are legally binding. Most important for
our study is that a yes vote is always a vote for change. The official vote information leaflets
that are sent to every eligible voter prior to a public vote reflects this as policy proposals are
discussed with reference to the current status quo. This means that we can concentrate on
the share of yes votes when evaluating the support for change.
Accepting a proposal may have far-reaching consequences and usually leads to changes
in public policy. Notable important votes include propositions on abolishing the army, the
participation in the integrated market of the European Economic Area, fundamental changes
to the federal tax code, and the future of the social security system.4 The high-stakes
nature of these proposals underscores the well-known inherent risk associated with supporting
change in politics (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Alesina and Passarelli, 2015; Augenblick and
Nicholson, 2016). Consistent with the close link between changes of the status quo and risk,
we observe in our setting that a higher predicted individual willingness to take risks relates
to a higher support of change as indicated by the likelihood to vote yes for a proposition (see
Appendix A).
Ballot propositions can be divided into two categories: referendums and popular initia-
tives. A mandatory referendum takes place for every proposed amendment of the federal
constitution. In addition, federal laws approved by both chambers of parliament are put to
a popular vote if a committee of citizens submits 50,000 valid signatures. Popular initiatives
allow citizens, parties, and interest groups to propose constitutional amendments. A vote
takes place if the initiators have collected 100,000 valid signatures.
People fill in ballot cards at home and traditionally bring them to the ballot box on the
voting weekend. The ballot card arrives by mail two to three weeks before the vote takes
4An overview of popular votes at the federal level in Switzerland is provided on the official webpage of
the Swiss government at https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/votes.html.
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place. The ballot boxes are open on Saturday and Sunday and they are located in the city
hall or in a public building. The ballot cards state the type of popular vote and the title of
the proposition.
As an alternative to voting at the polling station, all Swiss cantons have gradually in-
troduced postal voting since 1978, most of them during the 1990s (Hodler, Luechinger and
Stutzer, 2015). This has altered the way people vote. While all voters formerly had to cast
their votes at the ballot box before, only a fifth of voters did so in 2005 with comprehensive
postal voting (Federal Chancellery, 2005). However, roughly one third of the voters still cast
their votes via mail in the week preceding the voting weekend (Federal Chancellery, 2005).
More than half of the votes in our sample were cast at the ballot box or in the week before
the vote.
2.2 Data
We use three comprehensive data sources for our analysis. First, we draw on administrative
data on municipal vote outcomes for the years 1958 to 2014 from the Swiss Federal Statisti-
cal Office (SFSO, 2015). These data contain vote outcomes and turnout information for all
Swiss municipalities and federal propositions. In total, we have data on more than 870,000
municipal-level vote outcomes from 420 propositions in 2,538 municipalities. On average,
there are three voting weekends per year. We complement this data with vote recommen-
dations for propositions from parties based on Swissvotes, a database maintained by the
University of Bern and Anne´e Politique Suisse (Swissvotes 2012). For additional analyses,
we consider information on the electoral strength of parties at the municipal-level in federal
parliamentary elections from 1971 to 2011. For each voting date, we assign the latest election
outcome, or, in the case of the years before 1971, the electoral outcome in 1971. These data
are provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO, 2015).5
Second, we base our analysis on individual voting decisions from postvote surveys for
the years 1996 to 2006 (FORS 2014).6 Several Swiss universities and the private research
5We refer the reader to Appendix B for descriptive statistics.
6Note that for the year 1997 there is no municipality identifier available, thus we cannot use the data for
this year.
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institute GFS administered these surveys, called VOX surveys, after each voting weekend.
A representative sample of roughly 1,000 voters is contacted by phone. The resulting data
contain information on whether and how respondents voted, the method by which the ballots
were submitted (via mail or via ballot box at the polling station), several socio-economic
characteristics, political ideology, knowledge about the vote issues and which information
channels voters used.
Third, we use data on local rainfall from the Swiss Federal Office of Meteorology (Me-
teoSwiss 2015). It includes information on rainfall between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.7 An advantage
of our setting is the great variation in rainfall over time and space due to the specific to-
pography of Switzerland shaped by the Jura Mountains and the Alps. We gathered rain
data for all popular votes from 1958 to 2014 based on 116 automated meteorological sta-
tions. To construct a variable for rainfall at the municipal-level, we interpolate station-level
rain data using the inverse distance weighting function for the nearest three stations. As
rain conditions in the mountains can be considerably different from those in the lowlands
and in the foothills of the Alps, we excluded 17 weather stations above an altitude of 2,000
meters. We further dropped all stations with a distance larger than 30 kilometers from a
municipality’s set of stations. We construct an indicator variable for rain that is equal to
one for a municipality if it rained any time between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. on the Saturday or
the Sunday of the voting weekend. Note that measurement error in the rain variable would
create attenuation and may bias the estimated coefficients towards zero.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The extensive municipal and individual data allow us to explore the effect of rain, controlling
for a substantial amount of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. We examine the effect
of rain on political decisions with the following econometric model using municipal data:
Yjp = ηj + δp + αRainjp +X
′
jpβ + εjp,
7This rain variable provides us with a measure of rain for a time frame that is most relevant to voters.
This is in contrast to other studies that use measures which also include nightly rainfall, see, for example,
Hansford and Gomez (2010).
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where j indexes municipalities, p indexes propositions; Yjp is our outcome of interest, namely
the share of yes votes in percentage points; ηj is a municipality fixed effect; δp is a proposition
number fixed effect for each single vote — 420 fixed effects — which allows us to exploit within
vote date variation and therefore absorbs vote date-specific variation and seasonal variation;
α is the coefficient of interest; Rainjp is a dummy that is one if it rained in municipality j;
X ′jp is a matrix of covariates that may include variables such as turnout; β is a vector of
coefficients; and εjp is an idiosyncratic error term.
We cluster the standard errors at the cantonal level to take into account both spatial
correlation in rain and serial correlation in voting behavior. This is analogous to state-level
clustering for the United States, which is commonly regarded as most conservative option
and therefore the recommended one (Cameron and Miller, 2015).8
We complement the analysis of municipal voting data with a detailed investigation of
how rain affects voting decisions using individual-level data in a similar vein. The data allow
us to control for covariates as well as to estimate the effect of rain on ballot box voters and
postal voters separately.9
3 Rain and Votes Against the Status Quo
3.1 Main Results
We show the bivariate relationship between the share of yes votes and rain in the raw data in
Figure 1. It displays the density of the share of yes votes in percentage points on dry (dashed
black line) and rainy days (solid blue line). The figure reveals that the share of yes votes
is considerably lower on rainy days. While the average yes share is 46.8 percentage points
on dry days, it is 45.7 percentage points on rainy days. This descriptive evidence should be
interpreted with caution. It might be that municipalities with high average rainfall are more
likely to oppose political reforms per se. We therefore turn to the regression analysis that
8Note that the null hypothesis that rain has no effect on the share of yes votes is rejected at conventional
significance levels also when we use standard errors clustered at the voting weekend or two-way clustered
standard errors on voting weekend×municipality level. The standard errors are similar when we apply the
wild bootstrap approach.
9Appendix C provides a detailed exposition of the model at the individual-level.
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allows us to identify the effect of rain on the share of yes votes holding constant characteristics
that are specific to municipalities and propositions. We first consider the administrative,
municipal-level data and second the individual-level postvote survey data.
Figure 1: Rain and the Share of Yes Votes in Percentage Points
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Note: The figure shows two estimated densities of the yes vote share in percentage points for
rainy voting weekends (blue solid line) and dry voting weekends (black dashed line). The
density estimates stem from the Epanechnikov kernel function (bandwidth = 3.0) based
on 870,175 municipal-level vote outcomes. Conditional on municipal and proposition fixed
effects, the yes share density for voting days with rain stochastically dominates the yes
share density for voting days with no rain.
Municipal Data — Table 1 presents our main results from the municipal data set.
Column (1) shows the raw difference in means. It indicates that propositions on rainy voting
weekends have a yes share that is about one percentage point lower than propositions on
dry voting weekends. This difference might be the consequence of temporal and spatial
dependence that creates a spurious relationship between rain and the share of yes votes.
To hold constant common shocks caused by timing, we include proposition number fixed
effects in column (2). Inclusion of proposition number fixed effects takes into account the
idiosyncrasies of each of the 420 propositions and therefore also absorbs any date-specific
9
effects, including season-specific effects or opinion shocks. The estimated coefficient for rain
is -1.04. In column (3), we add municipality fixed effects to address the concern that mu-
nicipalities with more rain may be more conservative. The effect of rain remains unchanged.
Finally, we include linear municipal time trends in column (4) to demonstrate that spatio-
temporal trends do not drive our results.10 We use specification (4) as our baseline model
for the municipal data set throughout the rest of the paper to capture not only time and
spatial fixed effects, but also municipality-specific trends.
Figure 2: Flexible Functional Form Relationship Between Rain in Terciles and
the Share of Yes Votes in Percentage Points, Municipal Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in
percentage points together with a 95% confidence interval (thin line) and a 90% confidence
interval (thick line) using municipal data. The point estimates are based on regression
model (4) in Table 1 with indicator variables for the terciles of rainfall. The reference
category is zero rainfall.
In an additional analysis, we regress the share of yes votes on terciles of rainfall to
investigate the functional form between the two variables. Figure 2 depicts that even very
light as well as light levels of rainfall decrease the share of yes votes. These low levels of
rainfall are analogous to dark skies and some rain.11
10We provide additional specification checks in Appendix E.
11The Swiss Metereological Service classifies rain of 2mm per hour as heavy rain. In comparison, rainfall
of up to 4mm over the entire voting weekend can be considered as light rain. Therefore, we name the two
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Postvote Survey Data — We also estimate the effect of rain on the propensity to vote yes
using individual data from postvote surveys. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100 and
indicates the relative share of yes votes cast by a voter on the voting weekend. The results are
reported in Table 2. The point estimate of rain is consistently negative in all specifications
and varies between -2.85 and -5.15. It is robust to the inclusion of voting weekend and
municipality fixed effects as well as covariates that comprise age dummies, a gender dummy,
dummies for income categories and a dummy for holding a university degree.12 We also
estimate the relationship between rain and voting yes using a more flexible functional form.
The results indicate that the negative effect of rain is pronounced even for propositions with
light rainfall, which is qualitatively equivalent to the results using municipal data. In sum,
our main estimates from the two high resolution data sets suggest that there is a sizable
effect of rain on vote choices. This effect prevails even when we control for a large set of
fixed effects and individual covariates.
3.2 Placebo Tests
We assess the plausibility of the estimated rain effect in two tests. First, we conduct a placebo
test by randomizing rainfall across voting weekends. Second, we exploit an institutional
change — the introduction of postal voting — which allows voters to cast their votes before
the official voting weekend.
Random Rainfall — Due to the high spatial and temporal correlation in both the rainfall
and the voting data, the precision of the rain effect may be overestimated (Lind, 2019). To
address this concern, we follow Lind (2019) and Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl (2016) by using
flexible time trends. In a separate specification, we use municipal-year fixed effects to account
for spatial correlation over time. We also check whether the estimated rain effect is spurious
lowest terciles light and very light rain. We provide additional results on the functional form relationship
between rain and outcomes of interest in Appendix D.
12We include a dummy for 25 missing values for the variable university degree to keep those observations
in the estimation sample.
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Table 1: Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes
in Percentage Points, Municipal Data 1958–
2014
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes [0–100]
Avg.: 47%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -1.06** -1.04** -1.28*** -1.23***
(0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.38)
Proposition No. FE X X X
Municipality FE X X
Municipality Trends X
Observations 870,175 870,175 870,175 870,175
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.00 0.05 0.69 0.70
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share
of yes votes in percentage points using OLS. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain indica-
tor is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
Table 2: Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes
in Percentage Points, Postvote Survey
Data 1996–2006
Dependent Variable Voted Yes {0,100}
Avg.: 48%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -5.15*** -4.98*** -2.71** -2.85**
(0.89) (1.07) (1.04) (1.06)
Vote Weekend FE X X X
Municipality FE X X
Covariates X
Observations 12,970 12,970 12,970 12,970
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.00 0.13 0.28 0.29
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the
propensity to vote yes in percentage points using OLS. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal
level. The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends.
We can at most include vote weekend FE since the depen-
dent variable captures the share of propositions an individ-
ual voted yes for on any given voting weekend. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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in a placebo study based on Lind (2019). In a first step, we randomly assign future or past
voting weekend rainfall to a specific voting weekend (placebo rainfall). We then run our main
specification using the share of yes votes as dependent variable and the placebo rainfall as
independent variable. We repeat this procedure 500 times which should provide us with the
distribution under the null hypothesis that past and future weather should have no effect on
voting outcomes. If this placebo distribution of rain effects is very far from the theoretical
t-distribution, the rejection rate of our main regression is likely to be wrong because our
regression model fails to capture spatiotemporal trends that are present both in rainfall and
voting behavior. Figure 3 indicates that our empirical t-density under the null is very close
to the theoretical t-density. Accordingly, the omission of spatiotemporal trends seems to be
no concern for our regression results. A comparison of our main results in Table 1 with the
distribution of placebo estimates yields a p-value that is smaller than 0.01.
Figure 3 shows the resulting coefficients divided by their standard errors (black solid line)
together with the theoretical t-distribution (black dotted line). As expected in a placebo
study, the distribution of t-values is centered at zero. The vertical blue line depicts the
t-value of our baseline specification. It indicates that the size of the coefficient estimate lies
in the outer tail of the coefficient distribution. The obtained t-value of -2.77 is slightly larger
in absolute value than the critical empirical t-value at the 1% level, which is -2.72. Thus,
our regression coefficient for rain is statistically significant at the 1% level when compared
to the empirical distribution of t-values under the null hypothesis.
Postal Voting — Swiss cantons gradually introduced the possibility of postal voting in
addition to voting at the ballot box, which resulted in an increase in individuals who cast
their ballot card by mail before the voting weekend (Hodler, Luechinger and Stutzer, 2015).
We exploit this procedural change to shed light on the plausibility of our findings. Since
rain on the voting weekend should have no effect on early postal voters, we expect larger
effects in time periods with no postal-voting option. Accordingly, we compare the effect size
of rain before and after the introduction of postal-voting based on the municipality data.
For the individual-level data, we test whether postal voters are affected by rain on the voting
13
Figure 3: Randomized Rainfall
Note: The figure shows the empirical distribution of t-values under placebo rainfall, the
average t-value under our baseline specification, as well as the theoretical t-distribution.
Since we randomize rain at the voting weekend level, we use standard errors clustered at
voting weekend in all specifications here. The theoretical t-distribution therefore has 163
degrees of freedom. Note that we have fewer observations, 671,000 on average, than in our
baseline sample. This is because our panel is unbalanced and randomization of vote date
rainfall therefore leads to missing values. To obtain a plausible t-value for the comparison,
we computed the effect of true voting weekend rainfall in the same reduced samples and
averaged the resulting t-values. The average t-value of the treatment, -2.77, is depicted
by the blue line. The blue shaded area indicates the t-values which are smaller than the
estimated t-value. The critical empirical t-value at the 1% level is -2.72. The t-value of the
treatment in the full sample with voting weekend clustering is -3.20.
weekend. For both samples, we explore whether voters with access to postal voting might
be affected by rain before the voting weekend.
Table 3 reports the results for the municipal data. The effect of rain in periods with no
postal voting option is -1.4 percentage points (columns 1 and 2). Its magnitude is more than
0.41 percentage points higher than the effect on municipalities that offered supplementary
postal voting (columns (3) and (4)), although the two coefficients are not statistically signif-
icantly different from each other. Note that the negative effect of rain after the introduction
of postal voting is plausible as a considerable fraction of voters still voted at the ballot box.
A substantial fraction of voters, 37% on average in 2005, cast their votes in the week
preceding the voting weekend (Federal Chancellery, 2005). This means a rain effect is plau-
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sible in the week before the voting weekends in periods with postal voting, while we expect
to observe no effect of rain preceding the voting weekend in periods without postal voting.
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 3 add an indicator for the share of rainy days in the five days
prior to the voting weekend. This indicator ranges from 0, no rain, to 1, rain on all days.
The entries suggest that the pre-weekend rain has no effect if there is no option to vote
by mail, while pre-weekend rain has an effect if there is this possibility. For instance, if it
rains one day more in the week before the vote, the yes share is reduced by a substantial 0.5
percentage points.
Table 3: Sensitivity of the Rain Effect to Postal Voting
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes [0,100]
No Postal Postal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -1.40*** -1.40*** -0.99** -0.94**
(0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.44)
Rain Week Before Vote -0.20 -2.18**
(1.07) (0.88)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X X
Observations 441,731 441,502 428,444 428,264
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.77
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes
votes in percentage points using OLS. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain indicator is 1 for
all rainy voting weekends. The variable capturing the share of rainy
days in the five days before the vote date ranges from 0 to 1. On av-
erage it rained two out of five days before the voting weekend, which
is equivalent to a share of rainy days in the week before the vote of
0.4. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Effect of Rain on Ballot Box vs. Postal Voters
Dependent Variable Voted Yes Ballot Box Voter
All Ballot Box Voters Postal Voters All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rain Indicator -2.66** -4.25** -4.24** -1.59 -1.45 -0.17 -0.17
(1.04) (1.79) (1.78) (1.83) (1.82) (2.06) (2.15)
Rain Week Before Vote -3.55 -0.20 -6.37 0.10
(2.99) (3.30) (3.94) (4.53)
Vote Weekend FE X X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X X
Covariates X X X X X X X
Observations 12,961 4,994 4,994 7,967 7,967 12,961 12,961
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.29 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity to vote yes
(columns (1) through (5)) in percentage points using OLS. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy
voting weekends. The variable capturing the share of rainy days in the five days
before the vote date ranges from 0 to 1. On average it rained two out of five days
before the voting weekend, which is equivalent to a share of rainy days in the week
before the vote of 0.4. The dependent variable in columns (6) and (7) is either 0
or 100, depending on whether the voter voted at the ballot box or not. We have 9
missing values for the share of rainy days before the voting weekend. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The individual postvote survey data allow us to distinguish traditional ballot box voters
from postal voters, as respondents are asked about their methods of voting. In column (1) we
show the results for all voters, irrespective of the voting method; in columns (2) through (5)
of Table 4, we estimate separate regressions for the ballot box voters and postal voters. The
effect of rain on the propensity of ballot box voters to vote yes is -4 percentage points and
roughly three times larger than the point estimate of rain on individuals who vote by mail,
which is by itself not statistically significantly different from zero.13 Instead, postal voters
might be affected by rain in the last week before the voting weekend. While our estimates
are imprecise, the magnitudes of the estimates from the postvote survey data are consistent
with the results from the municipal data. In a further check, we test whether rain affects the
13The share of voters voting at the ballot box as indicated by the postvote survey seems to be reliable.
In 2005, slightly more than 20 percent voted at the ballot box according to the postvote survey, which is
consistent with official estimates (Federal Chancellery, 2005). Unfortunately, this was the only year in which
comprehensive administrative data on postal voting was gathered. Note that voters can cast their vote by
mail in some communities on the Saturday of the voting weekend (e.g., in the city of Bern) which explains
the negative point estimate of rainfall on the voting weekend on mail voters.
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probability to observe ballot box voters rather than postal voters on a rainy voting weekend
in columns (6) and (7). The results suggest that there is no selection to the ballot box due
to rainfall. In conclusion, the results from the two data sets provide strong evidence that the
effect of rain is not spurious, but is substantially driven by those voters whose decisions —
because of their vote timing — are expected to be most affected by rainfall.
3.3 Alternative Explanations
We focus on two possible alternative explanations, other than emotions, that could drive
the effect of rain on support for the status quo. First, we explore whether the effect of rain
might operate through a change in the composition of the electorate. A growing literature
provides evidence that rain affects turnout by altering the costs of voting (Hansford and
Gomez, 2010; Fraga and Hersh, 2011; Lind, 2017; Arnold and Freier, 2016; Fujiwara, Meng
and Vogl, 2016). If rain affects the electoral composition by including fewer people who
vote for a status quo change, the rain effect could not be interpreted as an emotion effect,
but rather as a consequence of a compositional change. We undertake four sets of tests to
explore this alternative channel. Second, we study whether rain affects individual information
acquisition.
3.3.1 Change in the Electoral Composition: Overall Turnout
In a first set of tests, we examine the relationship between rain and overall turnout. If we
regress turnout on an indicator variable for rain on the voting weekend, municipality fixed
effects, proposition fixed effects and municipal time trends, we obtain a coefficient of the rain
indicator of -0.34 with a standard error of 0.28. We also find no statistically significant effect
of rain on turnout in the postvote survey data, the estimate being +0.37 with a standard
error of 1.53. These results are robust to using standard errors clustered at the cantonal
level, the voting weekend level or at the municipality×vote weekend level. The coefficients
are statistically insignificant across the board and the standard errors are smallest when
clustering at the cantonal level.
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Figure 4: Flexible Relationship Between Rain in Terciles and Turnout in Per-
centage Points, Municipal Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates for the effect of rain on turnout in percentage
points together with a 95% confidence interval (thin line) and a 90% confidence interval
(thick line) using municipal data. The point estimates come from a regression of turnout
on indicator variables for terciles of rainfall while controlling for municipality fixed effects,
proposal fixed effects and municipal time trends. The reference category is zero rainfall.
Several reasons may account for the arguably small effect of rain on turnout. With few
exceptions, all municipalities have their own ballot boxes which translates into short travel
distances. This is in contrast to the US context where polling stations tend to be far away.
In addition, polling stations are usually well organized and queues outside the polling station
are very rare.
Previous research has pointed out that the effect of rain on turnout might not be uniform
with heavy rain having the most detrimental effect on voters’ probability of going to the
polls. To explore this, we estimate our main equation for turnout by using three dummies
for the different terciles of rainfall. Figure 4 shows the results of this regression. The effect
of rain on turnout is only statistically significantly different from zero for medium to heavy
rainfall. This effect is driven by the highest quintile of rainfall.
In stark contrast, the effect of rain on the share of yes votes is negative and statistically
significant even for very low levels of rainfall. Figure 5 compares the results for both turnout
and the propensity to vote yes in percentage points. The figure indicates that low levels of
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rainfall do not depress turnout but still decrease the yes share. At least at low and medium
levels of rain, the effect on the yes share seems not to be driven by changes in aggregate
turnout due to rainfall.
Figure 5: Effect of Rain on Turnout vs. Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes,
Municipal Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates for the effect of rain on turnout in percentage
points (black dots) and on the yes share in percentage points (blue triangles) using municipal
data. The dots are retrieved from regression model (4) in Table 1 using turnout or the yes
share as dependent variable and with indicator variables for terciles of rainfall instead of
one indicator. The reference category is zero rainfall.
3.3.2 Change in the Electoral Composition: Heterogenous Turnout Reactions
In our second set of tests, we explore the possible unequal impact of rain on turnout for
different groups of voters. Even if rain has no effect on aggregate turnout, it might be that
rain affects voting outcomes via turnout if turnout reactions are heterogeneous across groups
in the population. Consider, for instance, a situation in which leftist voters with a high
propensity to vote yes abstain on rainy days, while rightist voters with a low propensity to
vote yes are motivated to go to the polls if it rains. If the positive and negative effect are
similar in absolute terms and both groups are of similar size, aggregate turnout does not
change, but rain affects voting outcomes purely by changing the electoral composition.
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Turnout Reaction According to the Propensity to Vote Yes — The main worry
is that voters with a lower likelihood to vote yes select to the ballot box on rainy days.
To test this possibility, we estimate propensity scores in a linear probability model for the
likelihood to vote yes. We include an extensive set of covariates: dummies for age, gender,
household income, university degree, knowledge about the proposition, participation in past
votes, party preference, and ideology. Then, we partition the sample into groups according
to their predicted propensity to vote yes. Table 5 shows turnout reactions for individuals
above and below the median of predicted individual yes share (columns (1) and (2)) and for
terciles (columns (3) to (5)). The effect of rain on turnout across all groups is not statistically
significant and relatively small.14 If anything, the estimates suggest that individuals with
the lowest likelihood to vote yes are more likely to abstain from voting on rainy days which
means that any turnout effect would imply an increase rather than a decrease of the yes vote
share on rainy voting weekends.
Turnout Reaction According to Socio-demographics and Political Preferences —
Partitioning the sample with regard to covariates supports the conclusion of no systematic
compositional changes in the case of rain. Appendix Tables E.4 to E.6 report the turnout
reaction for different subsamples of voters conditional on party preferences, ideology, socio-
demographics, past turnout, and knowledge about the propositions. None of the point esti-
mates are statistically significantly different from zero.15 If anything, the absolute size of the
coefficient estimates indicates that voters with a high propensity to cast a no vote are more
likely to abstain if it rains. This compositional change would bias the main effect against our
findings because it would lead to a positive rather than a negative effect of rain on the share
of yes votes. For instance, right-wing voters, with a 10 percentage points lower likelihood to
vote yes than left-wing voters, show a lower propensity to vote on a rainy voting weekend.
14A similar picture emerges if we split the municipal level data into terciles according to the average yes
share. Note that if we cluster on the municipal level, the standard errors are similarly sized (see the notes
to Table 5 for the exact sizes).
15The estimates are all statistically insignificant also when clustering on municipal level.
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Table 5: Effect of Rain on Turnout Conditional on the Propensity to
Vote Yes
Dependent Variable Turnout {0,100}
Median Split Terciles Split
Status Quo Reformist Status Quo Swing Reformist
Median Pred. Yes Share: 33% 50% 33% 40% 50%
Avg. Turnout: 51% 70% 46% 63% 72%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rain Indicator 0.11 0.00 -1.70 0.96 0.55
(1.79) (1.77) (1.97) (2.46) (1.60)
Vote Weekend FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 11,223 11,222 7,482 7,482 7,481
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.23
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity to vote conditional
on the estimated propensity to vote yes in percentage points using OLS. The propensity
to vote yes was predicted based on a linear probability model with a full set of dummies
for year of age, gender, household income, university degree, knowledge, participation
in past votes, party affiliation, ideology, and dummies for missing values (the R-squared
is 0.07). The resulting propensities were used to partition at the median (columns (1)
and (2)) or into terciles of the likelihood to vote yes (columns (3) to (5)). The average
predicted propensity to vote yes is 46%. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the cantonal level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level are 2.03 in spec-
ification (1) (1,429 clusters), 1.67 (2) (1,396 clusters), 2.50 (1,305 clusters) (3), 2.39 (4)
(1,277 clusters), and 2.08 (5) (1,244 clusters) which means all coefficient estimates are
statistically insignificant at conventional levels also when clustering at the municipal
level. The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
There are weak indications that the same kind of effect might play a role for low-income
individuals, women, voters who vote less regularly, and voters with a high level of political
knowledge.
Simulation of the Overall Compositional Effects of Rain — To assess the aggre-
gate quantitative relevance of potential heterogeneous reactions to rainfall, we simulate the
compositional effects of rain. Appendix E shows these and additional results we refer to
below.
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In a first step, we use turnout differences across groups derived from the above variables,
weight them according to group size and multiply them with the average yes share of the
particular group. This allows us to predict the yes share for each group under rainfall
corrected for compositional changes. We do the same computation for voting weekends with
no rainfall. The comparison of the predicted yes shares allows us to obtain an estimate for
the change in yes votes as a consequence of compositional changes. We then correct our
main estimate for the effect of rain on the propensity to vote yes for this composition effect.
We find that the corrected estimates are very similar to the baseline estimates. Accordingly,
compositional changes seem unlikely to drive our main effect of rain on the support for
change.16
The reason why compositional changes have a negligible impact on vote outcomes are
twofold. First, the potential turnout reactions are relatively small and thus alter the electoral
composition only to a limited extent.17 Second, preferences for change are not too different
across groups based on covariates.18
In an additional check using individual level data, we examine whether rain is balanced
across covariates in the voter sample. Strong relationships between rain and the covariates
could indicate a violation of the random assignment of rainfall. However, across all estimates,
we do not find statistically significant relationships between the covariates and rainfall.
Turnout Reaction According to Willingness to Take Risks — Could it be that risk
averse individuals are more likely to turn out when it rains, while risk affine individuals are
less likely to turn out? In a first check, we exploit information on the willingness to take
risks based on the responses to a corresponding survey question on a scale from 0 (“not at all
willing to take risks”) to 10 (“very willing to take risks”) using data from the Swiss Household
16One concern may be that voters react differently depending on whether their party considers a proposition
important. However, when we correlate survey data on the importance of propositions as perceived by left-
and right-wing voters, we see that a one point higher perceived importance for left-wing voters relates to a
0.9 point higher perceived importance for right-wing voters. Moreover, we do not see a relationship between
how important left- or right wing voters perceive a proposition and their propensity to vote yes.
17Note that voters with a low level of political knowledge gain the most weight in the electorate from 44.7%
on days with no rain to 46.2% on rainy days.
18The highest spread in preferences for change is between individuals who said they have a left-wing
ideology (55% yes share) and those who identify with no particular ideology (40% yes share).
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Panel.19 We regress the reported willingness to take risks on dummies for each year of age,
gender, and an indicator for high education, that is, characteristics which have been shown
to be the most relevant predictors for willingness to take risks (Dohmen et al., 2010).20 In
the Swiss Household Panel, these covariates explain 7 percent of the variation. Using the
coefficients of the relationship between willingness to take risks and socio-demographics from
the Swiss Household Panel, we then predict the willingness to take risks in the VoxIt data.
The result is a data set that includes the individual predicted willingness to take risks and
information about voting behavior, including the propensity to vote yes and turnout.
The combined data on predicted willingness to take risks and turnout allow us to examine
whether individuals with a high risk aversion are more likely to vote when it rains. If this
were true, differential turnout effects for individuals with different levels of risk aversion could
be an alternative explanation for our main findings. Our findings indicate that the estimates
for both groups are statistically insignificant. If anything, the results point to a rather higher
likelihood of voting on rainy days for individuals with a higher risk affinity.21 This first check
thus suggests that our coefficient estimates of the impact of rain on the likelihood to vote
yes are a lower bound.
In a second check, we examine potential differential turnout effects using administrative
turnout data combined with aggregated risk data by municipality based on the data on
willingness to take risks from the Swiss Household Panel. The results show that the impact
of rain on the likelihood to vote is statistically insignificant in both subsets of municipalities
independent of the willingness to take risks. These two tests using individual level and
aggregate data on risk aversion and turnout thus suggest close to zero effects on turnout for
both risk averse and risk affine individuals.
19The question individuals answer is: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risk or do
you try to avoid taking risks, if 0 means “avoid taking risks” and 10 means “fully prepared to take risks”?”
This questionnaire item is equivalent to the one in the German Socio-Economic Panel, which was, among
others, experimentally validated by Dohmen et al. (2011) and Galizzi, Machado and Miniaci (2016).
20Consistent with the results in Dohmen et al. (2010), we find that willingness to take risks decreases in
age, increases in education and is higher for men.
21The estimates are also statistically insignificant if we use terciles instead of the median split.
23
Turnout Reaction According to Municipal Observables — Similar to the individual
level data, we also conduct sample splits with the municipal level data according to party
affiliation in the last parliamentary elections, population size, the share of area within the
municipality for agricultural use, the share of retirees, labor force participation, and the share
of individuals working in the tertiary sector. Across all the sample splits, we do not find
sizeable and statistically significant effects of rain on turnout. The largest coefficient is -0.37
with a standard error of 0.29. For the same specifications, we find statistically significant
effects of rain on the share of yes votes throughout.
3.3.3 Holding Turnout Fixed and Bounding the Causal Effect
Our third set of tests incorporates proxies for the electoral composition into our main analysis.
We start by controlling for turnout in our preferred specification using municipal data. The
entries in column (1) of Table 6 suggest that controlling for turnout does not affect the
coefficient of rain. It remains statistically significant with a point estimate of -1.3 percentage
points. The estimated coefficient remains at -1.3 when we control for turnout deciles, as
indicated in column (2). To account for differential mobilization of parties as a consequence
of rain, we interact turnout with party vote shares in the last parliamentary elections, both
measured at the municipal-level. Moreover, we interact party shares and turnout with the
federal party recommendations for the propositions. We do this as voters of a certain party
may only be motivated to vote when their party issues a recommendation. The size of this
effect may depend on the importance of the proposition, which is why we interact party
recommendations with turnout. In addition, we control for the lagged yes share, to account
for electoral trends. The results reported in column (3) indicate that a flexible control for
electoral composition does not affect the size of the estimated coefficient of rain.
We also re-estimate the main specification using the sample of individual vote data. In
column (4) of Table 6, we control for partisan preferences by including dummies indicating
a voter’s most preferred party. In column (5), we control for ideology captured as dummies
based on a left-right scale ranging from 0 to 10. In column (6), we include partisan preferences
and ideology jointly. In all three specifications, we control for average turnout in the past
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and voting method. The effect of rain on the probability of voting yes remains similar in
magnitude and statistically significant. In supplementary tests, we document that our results
are robust to leaving out specific parties or ideological positions.
Bounding the Coefficient Estimates — While the above checks do not suggest a bias
in the coefficient estimates because of selection, we present lower bound estimates in case
selection was present. We examine the extent of potential bias using the method proposed
by Oster (2019). The estimates suggests that selection would have to be more than 60 times
larger than what we capture with the observables for the causal effects to be zero. In sum,
the estimated lower bounds of the rain effect are very close to the estimated effect of rain
because the selection on unobservables would have to be very large for the true causal effect
to be zero.
3.3.4 Information Acquisition
Instead of changing the composition of the electorate, rain might affect voting decisions
by altering the type of information sources which citizens use to form an opinion. If it
rains, voters may spend more time reading the information booklet that comes with the
ballot card instead of watching television. Our data provides us with information about the
type of information voters use to gather knowledge about the propositions. The information
channels include television, radio, newspapers, and official government leaflets. In a first step,
we control for the type of information voters use. The results show that the estimated effect
size is very similar to the baseline model with a point estimate of -2.63 percentage points. We
also check whether rain has an impact on knowledge about the title of a proposition, which
in turn might affect the voting decision. We estimate the effect of rain on the probability
that a voter knows the exact title of the proposition for all voters as well as for ballot box
voters only. The effect of rain on knowledge is not statistically significant.
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Table 6: Robustness of the Rain Effect to Compositional Changes
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes Voted Yes
(Municipal Voting Data) (Individual Voting Data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain Indicator -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.28*** -2.91** -2.87** -2.91**
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (1.09) (1.12) (1.11)
Turnout -0.09*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.07)
Turnout Deciles X
Dynamic Partisan Controls X
Lagged Yes Share X
Preferred Party X X
Ideology X X
Average Turnout & Method of Voting X X X
Timing FE X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Trends or Covariates X X X X X X
Observations 870,175 870,175 829,848 12,970 12,970 12,970
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.31 0.31 0.32
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes votes (columns (1)
to (3)) or the propensity to vote yes in percentage points (columns (4) to (6)) using OLS.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain indicator is
1 for all rainy voting weekends. In years for which no election data is available, we take
those of the nearest election year. Note that we still have missing values for the election
results for some municipalities. “Dynamic Partisan Controls” includes party shares in
the last election, party shares interacted with turnout, party vote shares interacted with
party recommendations, as well as party shares interacted with party recommendations
and turnout. Party recommendations are represented by a dummy variable indicating
whether a right-wing/center right party (SVP or FDP) issued a recommendation to vote
yes. Party shares are represented by the combined vote shares of left-wing/center-left
parties (CVP, SP) and right-wing/center-right parties (SVP, FDP). The respective vote
shares are then interacted with turnout and party recommendation as indicated. “Lagged
Yes Share” is the average yes share on the last voting weekend at the municipal level.
“Timing FE” refers to “Proposition No. FE” in the case of municipal data and “Vote
Weekend FE” in the case of postvote survey data. When data on individual level co-
variates is not available, we include dummy variables for missing values of the respective
variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.4 Relevance of the Rain Effect
The results thus far have established a stable and precisely measured effect of rain on the
share of yes votes. One might, however, wonder whether the size of the rain effect is big
enough to also affect aggregate vote outcomes. We therefore simulate the impact of rain for all
the 420 propositions in our sample on vote majorities. Among these popular votes, 32 exhibit
a yes share between 48.8% and 51.2%. We illustrate the results of the simulation showing
the propositions for which rainfall could have changed the majority of votes in Figure 6.22
The blue triangle depicts the predicted outcome if it had rained in all municipalities, the
orange circle indicates the predicted outcome if rain had been completely absent across all
municipalities. The gray square is the official vote outcome. Among the ten votes for which
the popular majority might have changed with different rain conditions are the vote on
Switzerland’s membership in the European Economic Area in 1992 and one on asylum abuse
in 2002.23
4 Discussion
The main analysis provides evidence that the consequences of rain on voting decisions can be
interpreted as the effect of emotions. In this section, we explore the psychological mechanism
underlying the rain effect, test whether the effect is robust to high-stake situations, examine
whether negative emotions may lead specifically to an increase in support for traditionalist
conservative positions, and also whether the effect is driven by swing voters.
Psychological Mechanisms — Up to this point our results suggest that incidental emo-
tions, defined as emotions caused by factors that should not be relevant for a particular
22The simulated impact on vote majorities serves as an illustration of the impact of rain. In Switzerland,
however, initiatives and mandatory referendums only pass if they are approved by a majority of votes as
well as by a majority of cantons. If we take this institutional feature into account, we find that seven vote
outcomes might have changed.
23Regarding the former vote, the controversy on Switzerland’s relationship with the European Union would
likely be even stronger if a majority of the voters were to have approved the treaty while still failing as the
majority of cantons were to be missed.
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Figure 6: Simulated Vote Outcomes: Rain Effects on the Popular Majority
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Note: The figure depicts all propositions that would have had a different popular majority
with and without rain based on our main results. “Outcome Under No Rain” indicates the
share of yes votes if there had been no rain on the voting weekend in all municipalities.
“Outcome Under Rain” indicates the share of yes votes had there been rain on the voting
weekend in all municipalities.
decision context (Lerner et al., 2015), may have an impact on vote choices. A large body
of literature in behavioral economics, psychology and medicine has demonstrated that bad
weather or long winter nights lead to negative emotions (see, e.g., Lambert et al., 2002;
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi, 2003; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Baylis et al., 2018).24 Yet,
how do these negative emotions affect individual support for the status quo? In our view,
the most plausible explanation is a specific version of state dependent preferences.
A prominent characterization of state dependent preferences is projection bias (Loewen-
stein, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003). The main idea is that individuals project their current
preferences, which depend on their emotional state, into the future. These projected pref-
erences distort the perception of future payoffs. In particular, the projection bias suggests
24In a laboratory experiment, Lerner, Small and Loewenstein (2004) show that incidental disgust affects
the size of the endowement effect.
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that emotional states have a large effect on decision-making. Important forward-looking de-
cisions, even after careful deliberation, may thus be swayed by contemporaneous emotional
cues (Loewenstein, 2000). An example of projection bias is the empirical regularity that a
4WD vehicle looks much more useful on rainy days, while a convertible car offers a higher
projected future utility on sunny days (Busse et al., 2015).25 In our context, voters who are in
a negative emotional state caused by rainfall may project this negative state into the future
when evaluating the payoffs of a new policy. Note, however, that the theoretical formulation
of projection bias does not yield any prediction with respect to exactly how emotions affect
the support for the status quo.
A specific psychological mechanism that describes how positive and negative emotions
may alter status quo support is subsumed under feelings-as-information (Johnson and Tver-
sky, 1983; Schwarz, 2012). It postulates that individuals become more risk averse if they
experience negative emotions. As a consequence, they may evaluate the status quo relatively
more favorable. Evidence from laboratory experiments and recent evidence from the field
support the claim that individuals act more risk averse if they are unhappy or experience
fear (Schwarz, 2012; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Callen et al., 2014; Cohn et al., 2015; Meier,
2019). Previous contributions point out that feelings-as-information affects stock market be-
havior (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra, Kramer and Levi, 2003) as well as financial
decision making and voting behavior in the laboratory (Bassi, Colacito and Fulghieri, 2013;
Bassi, 2019).26
Exploring the psychological mechanism that drives the effect of emotions requires data on
risk aversion. As the postvote survey data offers no information on risk attitudes, we use the
data from the Swiss Household Panel introduced before. This survey contains information on
the willingness to take risks from a similar population in the same institutional environment.
25For further examples see Conlin, O’Donoghue and Vogelsang (2007), Simonsohn (2010), and Odermatt
and Stutzer (2019).
26A competing hypothesis to feelings-as-information is the mood maintenance hypothesis. It postulates
that individuals become more risk-averse if they experience positive emotions, because they want to preserve
their current positive emotional state, and conversely, they are more-risk affine if they experience negative
emotions (Isen, 2005).
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If feelings-as-information is the reason why emotions affect support for the status quo, we
expect that individuals are less willing to take risks on rainy days.
In Table 7, we show the estimates of the rain effect on the dichotomized measure of
willingness to take risks (based on a scale ranging from 0 to 10).27 If the willingness to take
risks is larger than the median value of 5, the dependent variable is 100, and zero otherwise.28
We regress this indicator on a rain indicator that is one if there was rain on the date of the
interview in the respective municipality. We find that rain decreases the willingness to take
risks by roughly 2.7 percentage points in our preferred specification in column (4) in which
we control for month and municipality fixed effects as well as for several covariates including
gender, age dummies, income and education dummies. Using the same rainfall terciles as
with the municipal-level data, we find that light rain most heavily affects the willingness to
take risks. This is consistent with our finding that already light rain substantially negatively
affects the yes share. In sum, these findings offer evidence suggesting a causal mechanism
whereby rainfall affects risk aversion and consequently makes people more likely to choose
the status quo. The additional analyses point to feelings-as-information as being the most
plausible psychological mechanism.
High-Stakes Votes — Psychological factors might play no role in high-stakes situations
(List, 2003; Levitt and List, 2008). We offer two specific tests of the generality of our main
effect. The first test splits the sample of propositions according to turnout and closeness.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 report the results for the regressions using above- and
below-median turnout. Median turnout in our sample is 42 percentage points. High turnout
propositions are arguably those collective decisions that are considered highly important by
a large fraction of voters. The results suggest that the rain effect prevails in high-turnout
propositions. Additionally, we also show the results of a sample split into close and not
close votes. We classify votes as close if the difference between yes and no votes ex-post
27For related evidence using data from Southeast Asia, see Liebenehm, Degener and Strobl (2018).
28The results remain unchanged if we do not dichotomize the risk attitude measure. Rain on the day of the
interview goes together with a statistically significant 0.16 point reduction on the 0 to 10 point Likert-scale
conditional on month fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, and covariates (the same specification as in
Table 7, column (4)).
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Table 7: Effect of Rain on the Willingness to
Take Risks, Swiss Household Panel
Data (Cross-Section of 2009)
Dependent Variable Willing to Take Risks {0,100}
Avg.: 47.5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -2.14** -3.75***-3.17***-2.70**
(0.94) (0.93) (1.04) (1.17)
Month FE X X X
Municipality FE X X
Covariates X
Observations 7,233 7,233 7,233 7,233
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the
propensity to be willing to take risks in percentage points
using OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the cantonal level. The rain indicator is one if there
was any rain on the exact date of the interview in the re-
spective municipality. The mean of the willingness to take
risk indicator is 47 percentage points.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
is less than 10 percentage points. The results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that rain
decreases support for a change from the status quo in both close and not close propositions.
Overall, the results sustain that the effect of emotions on support for the status quo extends
to important political decisions.
Status Quo vs. Right-Wing Votes — We explore another alternative interpretation of
our results, namely that negative emotions increase the support for traditional and conser-
vative propositions. Appendix F provides the results for this and the next paragraph in
tabular form. Since change is favored by the left-wing parties in some popular votes and
by the right-wing parties in others, we are able to separate the effect of emotions on the
support for the status quo from the effect on traditionalist conservative positions.29 To do
29A prominent example for a policy change supported by the right-wing parties was the vote on asylum
abuse in 2002, which demanded much stricter standards regarding asylum seekers. In about half of the votes
in our sample, the right-wing parties supported a change from the status quo.
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Table 8: Sensitivity of the Rain Effect to High Turnout and Close Votes
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes [0,100]
High Turnout Low Turnout Close Votes Not Close Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -1.24*** -1.40** -1.20** -1.20**
(0.36) (0.58) (0.46) (0.46)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X X
Observations 465,484 404,691 296,589 514,047
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.65 0.71 0.54 0.77
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percent-
age points using OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal
level. The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. High turnout corresponds
to above median turnout. Median turnout is 42 percentage points. Close votes cor-
respond to an ex post difference in the share of yes votes of less than 10 percentage
points. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
this, we split our sample according to the party recommendations. If emotions increase the
likelihood that voters will vote for conservative propositions endorsed by a right-wing party,
we expect to find that rain has a positive rather than a negative effect for this subset of
propositions. The results suggest that rain decreases the share of yes votes for all the propo-
sitions independent of whether they are supported by left- or right-wing parties. Similarly,
we do not see heterogeneities in voting behavior depending on whether unions supported a
proposition. It seems that emotions affect the support for the status quo in general, rather
than the support for specific partisan policies.
Swing Voters — We would expect that citizens with less intense policy preferences, often
called swing voters, are particularly affected by emotions.30 In order to identify swing voters
in popular votes, we predict the probability of voting yes for each voter based on his or her
individual characteristics with linear probability models. We then separate the electorate
30Note that we would expect individuals who are used to rain to react less strongly than individuals who
are not usually exposed to rainfall. Indeed, we see that there is a slight differential effect of rain depending on
whether municipalities are regularly exposed to heavy rainfall or not. While the effect is -1.32 (se = 0.34) in
municipalities with below-median average rainfall, it is -1.07 (se = 0.46) in municipalities with above-median
average rainfall.
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into terciles with respect to the predicted propensity to vote yes.31 We thus have three
groups, the status quo voters (P (Yes) < 0.44), the swing voters (0.44 ≤ P (Yes) ≤ 0.53) and
the reformists (0.53 < P (Yes)).
For these three groups, we run the main regression without covariates. The results suggest
that the swing voters are the ones who are substantially less likely to cast a yes vote if it
rains, while there are no statistically significant effects on the other two groups. Consistent
with this, we see the largest absolute effect of rain on vote outcomes within municipalities
that are in the middle tercile with respect to their average share of yes votes.32
5 Conclusion
This study provides real-world evidence on the relationship between emotions and preferences
for the status quo. We use exogenous variation in rainfall to show that individuals who expe-
rience negative emotions are 1.2 percentage points less likely vote for change. We explore sev-
eral mechanisms. Our findings are most consistent with a theory of feelings-as-information;
that is, the notion that negative emotions lead to less optimistic judgments (Schwarz, 2012).
The societal consequences of emotional choices can be substantial. Our simulation indi-
cates that emotions not just alter individual voting behavior, but may also sway aggregate
vote outcomes. A notable example is the referendum on Switzerland’s membership in the
European Economic Area in 1992. This proposition was rejected by a narrow margin of
voters on a rainy weekend. Our results suggest that the popular majority might well have
been swayed by positive emotions in case of good weather (with the proposition nonetheless
being rejected due to a missed majority of cantons).
These findings suggest that citizens are well advised to take important decisions on sep-
arate days. Even if the decision maker were aware of the possibility of being influenced by
rainfall, it might be difficult to alleviate the effect of emotions on behavior (Loewenstein,
31The split into terciles seems reasonable on substantive grounds: In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the
share of swing voters was estimated to be around 33% (Lutz, 2012).
32We do not see statistically significant heterogeneity in turnout because of rainfall across these groups at
the individual or at the municipal-level. The largest absolute effect on turnout is +0.92 (se = 3.18) among
individuals we define as swing voters and -0.45 (se = 0.28) in municipalities which are most likely to vote
for the status quo.
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2000). The impact of weather on voting outcomes also has implications for the agenda-
setting power of governments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Scottish independence
vote was intentionally scheduled to a date with a pleasant weather forecast (Sayers, 2014).
The impact of emotions on the tendency to choose the status quo likely extends beyond
the domain of voting behavior. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) have pointed out that
the status quo effect is a well-known phenomenon in financial and insurance markets as well
as in other domains. Thus far, we have a very limited understanding of how emotions affect
the choice between change and the status quo in decision-making with respect to household
finances, health, education and labor supply (see, e.g., Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). Exploring
the impact of emotions in these domains appears to be a fruitful area for future research.
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A Willingness to Take Risks and Voting
Figure A.1 shows the bivariate relationship between predicted individual willingness to take
risks and the likelihood to vote yes.
Figure A.1: Predicted Willingness to Take Risks and the Propensity to Vote Yes
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Note: The figure shows the relationship between predicted individual willingness to take
risks and the likelihood to vote yes. We construct the figure as follows: We first regress
willingness to take risks on years of age dummies, an indicator for gender, and an indicator
for university degree (which we set to 0 if the information is missing in the voting data)
using the data from the Swiss Household Panel. Then, we use the coefficient estimates based
on the data from the Swiss Household Panel to predict the willingness to take risks in the
VoxIt data where we know individual voting behavior. The figure shows the likelihood to
vote yes plotted against the willingness to take risks using 40 binned averages, the grey dots,
and a linear regression fit, the blue line. A regression of voting yes or no on willingness to
take risks indicates that a 1-point change in willingness to take risks relates to a 2.8-points
change (se = 0.45) in the the propensity to vote yes.
1
B Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of both the municipal voting
and the postvote survey data sets. Figure B.1 documents the average yes vote shares across
municipalities in a map. Figure B.2 provides a map of the location of the 116 automated
meteorological stations. Figures B.3, B.4, B.5, and B.6 provide an illustration of the temporal
and spatial variation in rainfall.
Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Data Municipal Voting Data Postvote Survey Data
1958–2014 1996–2006†
Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Yes Share in %-Points 46.20 14.49 0 100 47.93 36.91 0 100
Rain Indicator 0.55 0.49 0 1 0.68 0.47 0 1
Rain in mm 2.67 5.76 0 104.50 4.77 7.42 0 99.30
Turnout 43.59 13.21 0.16 100
Postal Voting Dummy 0.49 0.49 0 1
Ballot Box Voters 0.39 0.49 0 1
Mail Voters 0.61 0.49 0 1
Observations 870,175 12,970
Note: †There is no municipal identifier available for the year 1997, and the data from the corresponding
year is therefore not used.
Figure B.1: Map of the Share of Yes Votes
Note: The figure shows the average share of yes votes by municipality.
2
Figure B.2: Map of Weather Stations
Note: The figure shows the weather stations we use for our analysis.
Figure B.3: Distribution of Votes and Rain over Months
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Note: The graphs show the distribution of voting weekends over months and the share of
communities with rainy voting weekends by month.
3
Figure B.4: Map of the Share of Rainy Voting Weekends
Note: The figure shows the share of rainy voting weekends. Note that the clusters with the
high share of rainy weekends lie in the Alps and over the Jura mountains.
Figure B.5: Distribution of the Share of Rainy Voting Weekends over Munici-
palities
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Note: The blue line indicates the average share of rainy voting weekends which is 55%.
4
Figure B.6: Share of Communities with Rainfall by Date
Note: The figure shows the share of communities with rainfall for each voting weekend.
5
C Econometric Model for Individual Voting Decisions
As with the municipal data, we estimate the effect of rain on the propensity of an individual
to vote yes using the postvote survey data. We use the following specification:
Yijw = ηj + δw + αRainjw +X
′
ijwβ + εijw,
where i indexes voters, j indexes municipalities and w indexes voting weekends; ηj is a
municipal fixed effect; δw is a vote weekend fixed effect; Rainjw is a dummy that captures
rain in municipality j when voters vote on voting weekend w; X ′ijw is a vector of individual-
level covariates; εijw is an idiosyncratic error term. In the specifications with the survey
data, we use the share of yes votes cast by an individual on the voting weekend as the
main dependent variable. Accordingly, we have one observation for each voting weekend. In
our baseline specification, we include dummies capturing the following covariates: gender (1
dummy), year of age (80 dummies), income categories for household income (5 dummies),
and holding a university degree (2 dummies, one for 25 missing values). We replace missing
income with the modal income category, which refers to the category of income between
$5,000 and $7,000.
6
D Functional Form
This section explores potential non-linearities in the relationship between rain and vote
outcomes. Table D.1 presents the results of regressing vote outcomes on a continuous variable
of rainfall (in mm) and when using a dummy variable that is one only on vote weekends with
substantial rainfall. Figure D.1 complements Figure 2 in the main text by using rainfall
quintiles instead of terciles. Figure D.2 shows the effect of terciles of rainfall on the share of
yes votes in the postvote survey data. Figure D.3 reports the effect of rain on the willingness
to take risks using terciles of rain. We also show a plot of the residual yes vote share on the
municipal level against rainfall residuals in Figure D.4.
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Table D.1: Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes in Percentage Points,
Functional Form
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes [0,100]
Avg.: 47%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain Indicator -1.23∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.37)
Rain in mm -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
Above Median Rain -1.83∗∗∗
(0.45)
Very Light Rain, (0.0-0.8] -0.71∗∗
(0.29)
Light Rain, (0.8-4.3] -1.98∗∗∗
(0.54)
Med.-Heavy Rain, (4.3-105] -2.12∗∗∗
(0.58)
Quint. 1, (0.0-0.3] -0.72∗
(0.37)
Quint. 2, (0.3-1.3] -0.67∗∗∗
(0.22)
Quint. 3, (1.3-3.3] -2.10∗∗∗
(0.63)
Quint. 4, (3.3-8.1] -2.78∗∗∗
(0.70)
Quint. 5, (8.0-105] -1.92∗∗∗
(0.57)
Proposition No. FE X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Municipal Trends X X X X X X
Observations 870,175 870,175 870,175 870,175 870,175 870,175
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage points
using OLS. Above Median Rain is 1 if there was more than above median rainfall (conditional
on any rain) on the vote weekend or 2.09 mm. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the cantonal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure D.1: Flexible Relationship Between Rain in Quintiles and Share of Yes
Votes in Percentage Points, Municipal Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points using municipal data. The dots are retreived from regression model (4) in Table 2
with indicator variables for the five quintiles of rainfall instead of one indicator. The
reference category is zero rainfall.
Figure D.2: Flexible Relationship Between Rain in Terciles and Share of Yes
Votes in Percentage Points, Postvote Survey Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points using postvote survey data. The reference category is zero rainfall.
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Figure D.3: Flexible Relationship Between Rain in Terciles and the Willingness
to Take Risks
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the probability that an individual is
willing to take risks based on data from the Swiss Household Panel. The reference category
is zero rainfall.
Figure D.4: Residual in the Share of Yes Votes and Rainfall in mm
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Note: The figure shows a scatterplot of the share of yes votes residuals (in bins) against the
rainfall residuals (also in bins) conditional on all fixed effects and municipal trends (column
4, Table 1). The grey dots indicate 40 binned averages. The light grey line indicates residual
rainfall of zero.
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E Robustness Tests
In this section, we present several robustness tests that explore the sensitivity of our main
results to alternative specifications, measures, and explanations. For example, we present
results which indicate no differential selection to the ballot when it rains (Tables E.4 through
E.6), no differential information gathering when voters are suspect to rain (Table E.14), and
we bound the effect estimates in case of potential selection (Table E.13).
E.1 Fixed Effects, Standard Errors, and the Definition of the Rain
Variable
Table E.1 reports the results of specifications with cubic trends, municipal-month, and
municipal-year fixed effects. Table E.2 demonstrates that the coefficient of rain is also statis-
tically significant when we use standard errors clustered on the voting weekend or the vote
weekend×municipal level. Table E.3 estimates the effect of rain on the share of yes votes by
focusing only on close meteorological stations.
Table E.1: Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes in Percent-
age Points, Variants of Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes [0,100]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -1.24∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.41) (0.37) (0.42)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X
Municipality Trends X X X
Municipality Trends Quadratic X X
Municipality Trends Cubic X
Municipality × Month FE X
Municipality × Year FE X
Observations 870,175 870,175 870,175 870,175
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.80
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes votes in
percentage points using OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the cantonal level. The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends.
Mun. is a shorthand for municipality. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table E.3: Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes in Percentage Points,
Distance to Stations
Dependent Variable Share of Yes Votes [0,100]
Interpolated Rain Closest Station Rain
Distance to Closest Station: < 5, 000m < 10, 000m < 5, 000m < 10, 000m
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -1.04∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.25)
Rain Indicator Closest St. -1.41∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.37)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X X
Observations 156,404 441,768 153,818 432,677
Clusters 24 26 24 26
R–squared 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes votes in per-
centage points using OLS depending on the distance to closest weather station and on
whether the interpolated rainfall or the rainfall at the closest station is used. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain indicator is 1 for
all rainy voting weekends. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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E.2 Turnout and the Composition of the Electorate
The tables and figures in this section show the sensitivity of the coefficient estimates when
simulating the impact of turnout reactions of certain groups (e.g., Figure E.1), to dropping
certain groups from the sample (such as voters according to their decile of predicted likelihood
to vote yes, Figure E.2), the differential functional form relationship between rain and turnout
and rain and voting for the status quo (e.g., Figure E.6), as well as the impact of rain across
different types of voters and municipalities.
Figure E.1: Selection Corrected Coefficients, Postvote Survey Data
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Note: The figure shows turnout corrected coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals
(thin line) and 90% confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes
votes in percentage points with postvote survey data. The baseline estimate is shown with
the blue solid line. The depicted coefficients are corrected by heterogeneous selection within
groups of voters, for instance conditional on their past turnout behavior. Distant voters are
less likely to vote if it rains and are more likely to vote no — the opposite holds true for
more frequent voters. Accordingly the coefficient estimate is slightly adjusted downwards,
since we likely underestimate the true rain effect.
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Table E.4: Effect of Rain on Turnout in Percentage Points by Party and
by Ideology, Postvote Survey Data 1996–2006
Dependent Variable Turnout {0,100}
Left P. Right P. Missing P. Left I. Right I. Missing I.
Mean Yes Share 54% 45% 46% 55% 46% 40%
Avg. Turnout 71% 71% 53% 68% 64% 41%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain Indicator 0.60 -1.72 0.68 -0.85 -1.89 -0.12
(3.37) (2.94) (1.47) (3.25) (1.96) (3.71)
Vote Weekend FE X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Covariates X X X X X X
Observations 5,343 4,646 12,761 5,350 13,392 4,008
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.30 0.47 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.38
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity to vote in percentage
points using OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level.
The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. We categorize voters as preferring
left-wing (left p.) or right-wing parties (right p.) according to their surveyed preferences
over 17 parties. The major left-wing/center-left parties are SP and CVP, while the ma-
jor right-wing/center-right parties are FDP and SVP. All individuals with missing values
or no indication of preferences towards a specific party are characterized as “Missing P”.
“Left I.” and “Right I.” are based on a left-right scale where individuals can position
themselves on a scale from 0, radical left-wing, to 10, radical right-wing. We categorize
individuals with a value from 5 to 10 as having a right-wing ideology (Right I.) and those
with values from 0 to 4 as having a left-wing ideology (Left I.). Missing values on the
left-right scale are denoted as “Missing I.” Average turnout: 60.9%, maximum number
of observations containing turnout: 22,750. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table E.5: Effect of Rain on Turnout in Percentage Points by Socio-
demographics, Postvote Survey Data 1996–2006
Dependent Variable Turnout {0,100}
Inc. 1 Inc. 2 Inc. 3 Inc. 4 Inc. 5 Older Younger Male Female
Mean Yes Share 45% 46% 47% 51% 54% 47% 48% 48% 48%
Avg. Turnout 53% 57% 62% 65% 71% 52% 70% 59% 63%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Rain Indicator 1.79 2.36 0.88 -1.91 0.68 -0.78 1.83 -1.04 1.99
(3.72) (3.36) (1.94) (4.42) (2.86) (1.93) (2.31) (1.72) (2.46)
Vote Weekend FE X X X X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X X X X
Covariates X X X X X X X X X
Observations 2,663 5,583 8,859 3,045 2,600 11,820 10,930 11,199 11,551
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.41 0.33 0.27 0.42 0.45 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.21
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity to vote in percent-
age points using OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level.
The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. Average turnout: 60.9%, maximum
number of observations containing turnout: 22,750. “Inc. 1” means that the household
income is lower than $3,000, “Inc. 2” corresponds to household inc. between $3,000 and
$5,000, “Inc. 3” to income between $5,000 and $7,000, “Inc. 4” between $7,000 and $9,000
and “Inc. 5” to income over $ 9,000 which is the categories provided in the survey data.
Missing income was replaced by modal income category “Inc. 3”. “Older” is one if an in-
dividual is older than the median age, which is 46. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table E.6: Effect of Rain on Turnout in Percentage Points by Past
Turnout and Knowledge, Postvote Survey Data 1996–2006
Dependent Variable Turnout {0,100}
Rare V. Marginal V. Frequent V. Little Knowl. Much Knowl.
Mean Yes Share 39% 46% 49% 46% 50%
Avg. Turnout 12% 53% 91% 49% 77%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rain Indicator 0.55 -1.71 -0.16 1.80 -1.48
(1.64) (3.02) (1.77) (2.01) (1.88)
Vote Weekend FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Covariates X X X X X
Observations 4,434 7,931 9,773 13,060 9,690
Clusters 26 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.23
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity to vote using OLS.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain indica-
tor is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. Average turnout: 60.9%, maximum number of
observations containing turnout: 22,750. “Rare V.” are individuals who say that they
participate in less than 5 out of 10 votes; “Marginal V.” are individuals who say that
they participate in more than 4, but less than 8 votes out of 10 votes; and “Frequent
V.” are individuals who say that they participate in 9 or 10 out of 10 votes. We cate-
gorize individuals who know the title of less or equal to 3/4 of the votes on the ballot
as voters with little knowledge and the others as voters with a high level of knowledge.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure E.2: Sensitivity to Sample Selection by Predicted Propensity to Vote Yes
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points with postvote survey data. Each dot shows the coefficient estimate from our main
specification when dropping the group of voters within a decile of predicted yes share. The
propensity to vote yes is estimated in a linear probability models with dummies for age,
gender, household income, university degree, knowledge, participation in past votes, party,
ideology, and dummies for missing values within the group of voters. The estimate resulting
from all data (see Table 2, column (3)) is shown with the blue solid line.
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Figure E.3: Sensitivity to Sample Selection by Party Preferences
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points with postvote survey data. The estimate resulting from all data is shown with the
blue solid line. We combine individuals that say they are political but do not identify with
a party and individuals that do not identify with a party into one group. Similarly, we
combine all missing values into one group (couldn’t decide, NA, and missing).
Figure E.4: Sensitivity to Sample Selection by Ideology
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points with postvote survey data. The estimate resulting from all data is shown with the
blue line.
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Figure E.5: Flexible Relationship Between Rain in Quintiles and Turnout in Per-
centage Points, Municipal Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (thick line) for the effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points using municipal data. The dots are retrieved from a regression of turnout on indicator
variables for the five quintiles of rainfall while controlling for municipality fixed effects,
proposal fixed effects and cantonal trends. The reference category is zero rainfall.
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Figure E.6: Effect of Rain on Turnout vs. Effect of Rain on Share of Yes Votes,
Quintiles, Municipal Data
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates for the effect of rain on turnout in percentage
points (black dots) and on the yes share in percentage points (blue triangles) using municipal
data. The dots are retrieved from regression model (4) in Table 1 using turnout or the yes
share as dependent variable and with indicator variables for quintiles of rainfall instead of
one indicator. The reference category is zero rainfall.
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Figure E.7: Importance of Propositions as Perceived by Left- and Right-Wing
Parties
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Note: The figure shows the relationship between the average importance of propositions as
perceived by left-wing/center-left voters (CVP and SP) and right-wing/center-right voters
(SVP and FDP) based on 157 propositions. The figure is constructed as follows: We first
take survey responses about the perceived personal importance on a scale ranging from
”not important” (0) to ”very important” (10) for each individual from the standardized Vox
surveys, which cover propositions from 1981 to 2010 but do not include municipal identifiers.
We then collapse these scores on the proposition level based on the party affiliation of the
voters. The gray dots show the binned averages of the importance by voters on the left
over 20 quantiles against the perceived importance by voters on the right. The blue line
indicates a simple regression of ”left importance” on ”right importance” based on all the
157 votes available in this data set. A one point increase in importance as perceived by
voters on the right relates to a 0.9 point increase in the importance as perceived by voters
on the left (se = 0.04).
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Table E.8: Effect of Rain on Turnout in
Percentage Points According
to Willingness to Take Risks
(WTR) — Individual Level
Dependent Variable Turnout {0,100}
High WTR Low WTR
Avg. Yes Share 50 46
Avg. Turnout 59 62
(1) (2)
Rain Indicator 0.81 0.27
(2.10) (1.86)
Vote Weekend FE X X
Municipality FE X X
Covariates X X
Observations 11,278 11,472
Clusters 26 26
R–squared 0.19 0.17
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of
rain on the propensity to turnout conditional on
the estimated willingness to take risks using OLS.
The willingness to take risks (WTR) was predicted
based on a linear probability model with dum-
mies for age, gender, and university degree and the
corresponding coefficient estimates from the Swiss
Household Panel. The resulting propensities were
used to partition the sample at the median pre-
dicted willingness to take risks (columns (1) and
(2)). The regressions condition only on income as
the other covariates are used for the prediction.
The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting week-
ends. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
24
Table E.9: Effect of Rain on Turnout and Yes Share in Percentage
Points According to Willingness to Take Risks (WTR)
Dependent Variable Turnout [0,100] Share of Yes Votes [0,100]
High WTR Low WTR High WTR Low WTR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -0.41 -0.29 -0.97∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.28) (0.37) (0.33)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X X
Observations 285,455 146,731 285,455 146,731
Clusters 24 24 24 24
R–squared 0.73 0.70 0.75 0.74
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on turnout in percentage points
using OLS according to sample splits based on above or below median willingness
to take risks (WTR) among municipalities in 2009. The willingness to take risks
is from collapsed individual-level data from the Swiss Household Panel. The me-
dian willingness to take risks is 50%. Note that this measure may not be very
informative for most years other than 2009 because of changes in the composition
of municipalities over time. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
cantonal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table E.10: Effect of Rain on Turnout and Yes Share
in Percentage Points by Left- and Right-
Wing Municipalities
Dependent Variable Turnout [0,100] Yes Votes [0,100]
Right Left Right Left
Avg. Yes Share 47% 46% 47% 46%
Avg. Turnout 43% 45% 43% 45%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -0.35 -0.35 -0.83∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗
(0.37) (0.22) (0.25) (0.61)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X X
Observations 418,572 418,548 418,572 418,548
Clusters 26 24 26 24
R–squared 0.66 0.77 0.71 0.74
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on turnout
in percentage points using OLS according to sample splits based
on above or below median support in a municipality of the right-
wing/center right parties (FDP and SVP) in the last or closest
national council elections. The median support is 52.7%. Note
that we have missing values for the election results for some mu-
nicipalities. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
cantonal level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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E.3 Bounding the Potential Bias Because of Selection
The method proposed by Oster (2019) formalizes the following intuition: If one adds controls
to a regression and both the coefficient of interest as well as the R2 change a lot, one should
be worried. The approach compares the change in R2 to the change in the coefficient estimate
to gauge the true causal effect or the amount of selection necessary such that the true causal
effect is zero. The method requires a choice of the maximally attainable R2 in our setting.
We follow Oster’s (2018) suggestion to assume an attainable R2 of 1.3 times the R2 of the
specification with controls and fixed effects.
On the basis of this assumption, we estimate two parameters: δ and β∗. The parameter
δ indicates how much larger the selection on unobservables would have to be, compared to
the selection on observables, for the true causal effect to be zero. The parameter β∗ reflects
the lower bound estimate of the causal effect assuming that the selection on unobservables is
weakly smaller than twice the selection on observables (0 > δ ≥ −2). The sign of δ is negative
because the unobservables would have to be negatively correlated with the observable controls
for the coefficients to be 0. The reason is that the inclusion of controls increases the absolute
size of the coefficient estimates.
Table E.13 shows the results. We first estimate the regression with all fixed effects, but
no controls (the baseline specifications in Table 1, column (4), for the municipal data and in
Table 2, column (4), for the individual level data). In a second step, we estimate the most
comprehensive specification (Table 6, column 3, for the municipal level data and Table 6,
column (6), for the individual level data). The estimates suggests that selection would have
to be more than 60 times larger than what we capture with the observables for the causal
effects to be zero.
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Table E.13: Sensitivity of the Estimates to a Potential Violation of the Exclusion
Restriction
Dependent Variable
Share of Propensity
Yes Votes to Vote Yes
(1) (2)
β∗ δ β∗ δ
Rain Indicator -1.25 -82 -2.78 -60
Observations 829,848 829,848 12,970 12,970
Note: The table shows lower bound estimates of the ef-
fect (assuming δ = -2), β∗, and the selection parameter,
δ, which indicates how much more of the selection would
have to be explained by unobservables rather than ob-
servables for the true effect to be 0. The parameters are
estimated based on Oster’s (2018) method. Standard er-
rors specified for the estimation are clustered on the can-
tonal level. The estimates are based on a comparison
of the R–squared including all controls and fixed effects
(Table 6, column (3), for the municipal level data and
Table 6, column (6), for the indvidual level data) with
the R–squared without any controls (Table 1, column (4)
for the municipal level data and Table 2, column (4) for
the individual level data).
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E.4 Information Acquisition
Table E.14 shows results which hint at whether individuals change their media consumption
and as a result know more or less about a given vote in reaction to rainfall.
Table E.14: Robustness of the Rain Effect to Change in
Information Sources
Dependent Variable Voted Yes Individual Knowledge
{0,100} [0,1]
All Voters All Ballot Box
(1) (2) (3)
Rain Indicator -2.63∗∗ -0.00 -0.02
(1.18) (0.01) (0.02)
Information Channel FE X
Vote Weekend FE X X X
Municipality FE X X X
Covariates X X X
Observations 11,801 12,970 5,003
Clusters 26 26 26
R–squared 0.31 0.28 0.41
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity
to vote yes (column 1) or the propensity to know the title of the
propositions (columns (2) and (3)) in percentage points using OLS.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level.
The rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. “Information
Channel FE” includes dummies capturing the kind of information
sources a voter used. Knowledge ranges from 0 to 1 indicating the
share of proposition titles the voter knew of all propositions on the
ballot. We only include voters that voted at the ballot box in col-
umn (3). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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F Discussion: Heterogenous Reactions
Table F.1 splits our sample according to the vote recommendations of different parties and
unions to address whether voting “no” is equivalent to voting for a specific political ideology.
Table F.2 presents the results of regressing yes votes on rain for different groups of voters,
namely status quo voters, swing voters, and reformist voters.
Table F.1: Effect of Rain on the Share of Yes Votes by Party and Union
Recommendations
Dependent Variable Yes Share [0,100]
Right R. No Right R. Yes Unions R. Yes Unions R. No
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain Indicator -1.03∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.42) (0.45) (0.40)
Proposition No. FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X X
Observations 313,998 556,177 465,081 325,551
Clusters 26 26 26 26
R–squared 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.72
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the share of yes votes in percentage
points using OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The
rain indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. “Right R. Yes” corresponds to a recom-
mendation to vote yes of the right-wing/center-right parties SVP or FDP. “Right R. No”
encompasses all other votes. “Union R. Yes” corresponds to a recommendation to vote yes
of the major unions. For some votes, parties and unions did not issue recommendations.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table F.2: Sensitivity of the Rain Effect Conditional on the Propensity
to Vote Yes
Dependent Variable Voted Yes {0,100} Share of Yes Votes [0–100]
Status Quo Swing Reformist Status Quo Swing Reformist
Voters Voters Voters Mun. Mun. Mun.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain Indicator -1.59 -6.41∗∗∗ -3.19 -0.88∗ -1.27∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗
(2.18) (2.08) (2.30) (0.44) (0.55) (0.31)
Vote Weekend FE X X X
Proposal No. FE X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Municipality Trends X X X
Observations 4,324 4,323 4,323 290,341 290,127 289,707
Clusters 26 26 26 23 23 21
R–squared 0.37 0.39 0.48 0.69 0.70 0.74
Note: The table shows the estimated effect of rain on the propensity to vote yes (columns
(1) to (3)) or the share of yes votes (columns (4) to (6)) in percentage points using
OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the cantonal level. The rain
indicator is 1 for all rainy voting weekends. The propensities to vote yes are esti-
mated with linear probability models with dummies for age, gender, income, college
degree, knowledge about the vote, past participation in votes, parties, ideologies and
missing values. Propensities of yes votes at the individual level: status quo voters
(−0.14 < P (Yes) < 0.44), swing voters (0.44 ≤ P (Yes) ≤ 0.53) and reformists (0.53 <
P (Yes) < 1.08). Average share of yes votes at the municipal level: status quo munici-
palities (0.32 < Share(Y es) < 0.45), swing municipalities (0.45 ≤ Share(Y es) ≤ 0.48)
and reformist municipalities (0.48 < Share(Y es) < 0.57). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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